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Any one owning or keeping an animal that he knows to be of a ferocious dispo-
sition; accustomed to attack or bite mankind, is bound to restrain such animal at
nis peril.
Allowing a dog to be kept on the premises does not render the owner of the pre-
mises liable for injuries inflicted by the dog away from the premises if such owner
did not own or have control of the dog.
The onus is on the plaintiff to prove the knowledge of the owner or keeper of the
vicious propensities of the animal, if it be of a domestic nature, though it is other-
wise where it is of a wild and untamable nature.
Knowledge of a servant or wife is not knowledge of the owner or keeper, unless
it be a servant who has general charge of the keeping of the animal.
To charge the defendant he must be shown to have knowledge that the animal is
inclined to do the particular kind of mischief that has been done.
THIS was an action brought by the appellants in the court below
to recover damages for injuries from the bite Of a dog. The facts
are sufficiently stated in the opinion.
G. W. Thomas and A. B. lc.Kaig, for appellants.
J. A. UcHfenry, Win. H. Price and H. K.. Douglas, for ap-
pellees.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
ALv.Ey, J.-The appellants in this case were the plaintiffs below.
and they brought the action to recover of the defendant for injuries
received, by the female plaintiff, by the bite of a dog, alleged to
have belonged to or to have been kept by the defendant, with
knowledge that the dog was ferocious and dangerous.
In regard to the law of the case it is well settled that if any
person keeps an animal, mansuete naturce, of a ferocious or vicious
disposition, accustomed to bite or attack mankind, knowing that it
is possessed of such disposition or vicious propensity, he is bound
to restrain such animal, at his peril; and if he allows it to escape
or go at large he is liable for all the injury it may inflict by attack-
ing persons in consequence of such ferocious propensity.
As declared by the Queen's Bench. in May v. Burdett, 9 Q. B.
101, "Whoever keeps an animal accustomed to attack and bite
mankind, with knowledge that it is so accustomed, is prima facie
liable in an action on the case, at the suit of any person attacked
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and injured by the animal, without any averment of negligence or
default in the securing or taking care of it. The gist of the
action is the keeping the animal after knowledge of its mischievous
propensities."
The owner or keeper of the dog or other domestic animal must
be shown to have had knowledge of its disposition to commit such
injury, and the burden of proving this fact is on the plaintiff,
though it would be otherwise if the animal was of a nature to be
fierce and untamable, such as bears, tigers, etc.: Spring Co. v.
-Edgar, 99 U. S. 654.
The notice which will charge the owner or keeper with liability
for the vicious conduct of the animal must be notice that it was
inclined to do the particular mischief that had been done. Hence,
notice that a dog is ferociously disposed toward cattle is no notice
that he will attack persons. It is not necessary to show that the
owner or keeper of a vicious dog has seen the animal attack man-
kind; but it is sufficient to show that the vicious propensity of the
animal has in some way been brought to the knowledge of the owner
or keeper, so as to admonish him to take the necessary precaution
to prevent injury in the future. Hence, the question in each case
is whether the notice was sufficient to put the owner or keeper on
his guard, and to require him to anticipate the injury that has
actually been done. And this duty of guarding against the vicious
propensity of a dog or other domestic animal is imposed upon the
keeper thereof, irrespective of the fact of ownership: Cooley on
Torts 344.
The question presented by the first bill of exception is as to the
admissibility of evidence to prove the scienter. After giving evi-
dence of the injury inflicted by the dog, the plaintiffs gave evidence
to prove that the defendant was a butcher in Cumberland and that
he had about his premises a colored man as an assistant, who drove
the meat wagon and delivered meat to the customers of the defend-
ant, and that the dog was frequently with him and generally fol-
lowed him. They then offered to prove that this colored man
knew that the dog was vicious and dangerous, and was disposed to
attack and bite and injure persons, and that such colored man
while in the employ of the defendant had told one of the plaintiff's
witnesses that he had made known to the defendant, before the
injury to the plaintiff, that the dog was of a vicious disposition, and
had attacked and bitten other persons. To this offer the defendant
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objected, and the objection was sustained by the court, and as we
think, rightly sustained.
It is very true, as shown by the authorities, that if the owner
of a dog place it in the charge and keeping of a servant, the ser-
vant's knowledge of the dog's ferocious disposition is the knowl-
edge of the master; but it is not true that the knowledge of any
servant that a dog may follow or be with about the premises where
he is employed, as to the disposition of the dog, is to be imputed
to the master. This is clear upon all the authorities.
The case that goes as far upon this question as'any other to be
found in the reports, and which has been mainly relied on by the
appellants, is that of -ladman v. Johnson, 86 L. J. (0. P.) 153,
where notice of the mischievous propensity of the dog, given to
the wife of the defendant, who attended to the business of her hus-
band in his absence, for the purpose of being communicated to the
husband, was held to be some evidence of a scienter to be con-
sidered by the jury.
But in delivering judgment in that case, BOVILL, 0. Ji., says:
"I am not prepared to assent to the proposition that notice to
an ordinary servant, or even to a wife, would in all cases be suffi-
cient to fix the defendant, in such an action as this, with knowledge
of the mischievous propensity of the dog. But here it appears
that the wife attended to the milk business, which was carried on
upon the premises where the dog was kept, and that a formal com-
plaint as to that dog was made to the wife, when on the premises,
and for the purpose of being communicated to her husband. It
may be that this is but slight evidence of the scienter, but the only
question is whether it is evidence of it. I think it is."
,This case was referred to and commented upon in Good v.
Martin, 57 Md. 610, 611. And in the case of Stiles v. Oardiff
St. Nav. Co., 33 L. J. (Q. B.) 319, where a similar question arose,
the Lord Chief Justice said that notice of the vicious propensity of
the dog given to porters or servants employed about the premises
would not suffice; but that if brought home to a person who had
the general management of the yard in which the defendants them-
selves could not be supposed to be acting, and who had authority to
say whether a dog should be kept there or not, or whether it should
be chained up or not, it would be otherwise.
The case of Baldwin v. Casella, L. R., 7 Exch. 325, proceeded
upon the ground that the defendant had deputed to his coachman
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the care and control of the dog, and therefore a notice to him of
the vicious nature or propensity of the dog was notice to the
master. And there is nothing in the case of Appleton v. Percy,
L. R., 9 C. P. 647, that in any way contravenes the principle of
the previous cases to which we have referred. We are clearly
of opinion, therefore, upon the facts as stated in the bill of excep-
tion, that the knowledge, whatever it may have been, of the negro
man, in regard to the propensity of the dog, was not legally imput-
able to the defendant; and especially were not the declarations of
the negro man evidence against the defendant. The man himself
should have been called as witness.
Of the several prayers offered by the plaintiffs, those granted
would seem to have given the plaintiffs the benefit of all the law to
which they were entitled, and that, too, in a most liberal form; and
those rejected were clearly erroneous, and therefore properly
rejected. The fourth and fifth prayers rejected by the court
appeared to have been based entirely upon the evidence that was
offered, but which was excluded by the court upon objection.
The evidence not being before the jury, of course it could not be
made the basis of an instruction to them. Besides, those prayers
did not even require the jury to find that the vicious disposition of
the dog was to attack and injure mankind, but simply that the dog
was of vicious or dangerous propensities. This alone was a defect
which made them misleading, and therefore required their rejection.
Judge v. Cox, 1 Stark. 285 ; Wood on Law of Nuisances, § 761.
The seventh prayer asked the court to say that there was no
sufficient evidence to be submitted to the jury, of any contributory
negligence on the part of the female plaintiff in bringing about the
injury complained of, to defeat the right to recover. The prayer
was properly rejected; for although the evidence is manifestly very
meagerly and defectively set out in the record as to the precise
circumstances of the injury, yet it is stated in a general way that
evidence was given "tending to prove that the plaintiff (Mary)
knew the said dog, and knew that he was a dog liable to attack
persons, aid was of a fierce disposition, and that she had encouraged
the dog to be in and about her premises prior to said injuries." If
she had cultivated a familiarity with the dog, and encouraged him
to come to her house and be about her, with knowledge of his dis-
position, it was certainly evidence to go the jury upon the subject
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of contributory negligence on her part, and the court was therefore
right in refusing the prayer.
The first prayer on the part of the defendant, which was granted,
we do not understand to be seriously questioned. But the third
and fourth prayers of the defendant, which were granted by the
court, are questioned by the plaintiffs. The third prayer sought
to preclude the right to recover upon the ground of contributory
negligence on the part of the female plaintiff, Mary, and if the
facts therein enumerated were found by the jury, they certainly
constituted a good ground of defence. Cooley on Torts 846.
In granting the fifth prayer, the jury were instructed that if they
found that the dog committing the injury did not belong to the
defendant, but was at the time the exclusive property of the defend-
ant's son, a young man over twenty-one years of age, and that the
latter "had sole charge, custody, and control of said dog, and
that the defendants never had the custody, care or control of said
dog, and that the injury complained of occurred off the premises of
the defendant, and upon the premises of the plaintiff, Mary E., a
half mile away," then the defendant was not liable, although the
jury might "find that the defendant allowed said dog to be kept
by his son on or about his premises." This instruction we think
unobjectionable. The defendant, to be liable for the vicious con-
duct of the dog, must have been either owner or keeper of the
animal, or had some control of him. If he was neither owner or
keeper, and had no control of the dog, and the injury was done
away from his premises and out of his presence, it is difficult to
perceive upon what principle he could be held liable.
In the case of Auchmuty v. Ham, 1 Denio 495, where the
damage was done by the dog away from the premises of the defend-
ant, it was held not to be sufficient to render the defendant liable,
that the dog belonged to the defendant's hired man-servant, who
kept the dog at the defendant's house during the day but took him
away at night.
The principle of that case would seem to apply fully to this, and
be an authority for granting the fifth prayer of the defendant, if
any authority were needed.
Finding no error in the rulings of the court below, we must
affirm the judgment.
The keeper of animals ferm naturce, fade liable without notice for any dam.
such as lions, tigers and the like, is prima age that one may receive from them.
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And in such case, it is not necessary for
the plaintiff in his declaration to aver
negligence in the owner or keeper, for the
reason, that such animals are by nature
fierce and dangerous, and their owner is
supposed to be acquainted with their
nature. See Congress Spring Co. v.
Edgar, 99 U. S. 645 ; the leading case of
May v. B.urdett, 9 Q. B. (N. S.) 101;
and the cases cited below.
The owner or keeper of animals man-
sueta naturm, such as horses, oxen, cows,
sheep, swine, dogs, etc., can on the other
hand only be rendered liable by proving
notice of their mischievious propensities,
and such notice must be averred in the
declaration.
There is, however, no distinction be-
tween the cases of keeping an animal
which breaks through the ordinary tame-
ness of its nature and becomes fierce,
and is known by its owner or keeper
to be so, and the keeping of one, ferce
naturm : Jackson v. Smithson, 15 M.
& W. 563; s. c. 15 L. J. Ex. 311;
Popplewell v. Pierce, 10 Cash. 509.
Primafadce he who keeps a dog or any
other animal which is ordinarily of a
quiet and domestic nature, after notice
that such animal has done hurt, has
exhibited a fierce and threatening dispo-
sion towards or has made an attack upon
a person, biting or injuring him, is there-
upon made liable in an action for dam-
ages: Alay v. Burdett, 9 Q. B. (N. S.)
101 ; Congress Spring Co. v. Edgar, 99
U. S. 645; Perkins v. Mossman, 44 N.
J. L. 579 ; Pickering v. Orange, I Ill.
338 ; Kightlinger v. Egan, 75 Id. 141 ;
s. c. 64 Id. 235; Wormley v. Gregg, 65
Id. 251 ; Partlow v. Ilaggarty, 35 Ind.
178; Durden v Barnett, 7 Ala. 169 ;
Marsh v. Jones, 21 Vt. 378 ; Dearth v.
Baker, 22 Wis. 73 ; McCaskill v. Elliot,
5 Strob. 196 ; Murray v. Young, 12
Bush 337 ; Barclay v. Leonard, 4 Den.
500 ; Campbell v. Brown, 19 Penn. St.
359. Most of the cases above cited
lay down the rule, that the gist of the
action is the keeping with notice or
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knowledge of the vicious propensity, and
that an averment of negligence in the
declaration is not necessary. The fol-
lowing cases are explicit upon this point;
May v. Burdett, supra; Congress Spring
Co. v. Edgar, supra; Campbell v.
Brown, supra; Poppenwell v. Pierce,
supra ; Jackson v. Smithson, supra; Dur-
den v. Barnett, 7 Ala. 169.
A man may keep a dog, which he
knows is disposed to bite, but in such
keeping he takes upon himself all risks,
and renders himself liable for all inju-
ries sustained by persons pursuing their
ordinary callings : Logue v. Link ; 4 E.
D. Smith 63; Kelly v. Tilton, 3 Keyes
263; Stumps v. Kelley, 22 Ill. 140.
Negligence of the owner of an animal
will likewise render him liable; and
when negligence is averred, it will not
be necessary to aver knowledge of mis-
chievious propensities. See Dickson v.
McCoy, 39 N. Y. 400; Fallen v.
O'Brien, 12 R. I. 518; Goodman v.
Gray, 15 Penn. St. 188, where it was
held that the owner of & horse who vol-
untarily permits it to go at large in the
streets of a populous city, is answerable
to an individual who is kicked, without
proof that he knew it was vicious. To
the same point, see Dickson v. McCoy,
39 N. Y. 401.
As to the extent of the knowledge or
notice that will charge the owner or
keeper, it would seem that notice of
facts which would put a careful and pru-
dent man upon his guard, or upon
inquiry, is sufficient notice. Under a
count alleging a ferocious and dangerous
disposition in a dog, proof of a knowl-
edge of a dangerous propensity of the
animal has been held sufficient: McCas-
kill v. Elliot, 5 Strob. 196. In the
words of the court, per WARDLAW, J..
" To require that a plaintiff before lie can
have redress for being bitten, should
show that some, other sufferer had pre-
viously endured harm from the same
dog, would be always to leave the first
wrong unredressed, and to lose sight of
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the thing to be proved in addition to one
of the means of proof."
Notice to the defendant of mischief
to mankind on a single previous occasion
is sufficient. See Arnold v. Norton, 25
Conn. 92; Kittredge v. Elliott, 16 N.
H. 77; Smith v. Pelah, 2 Stra. 1264.
Where the owner of a dog which has
bitten other persons, has notice of the
fact and afterwards suffers him to be at
large, and he bites the plaintiff, it is no
answer to the plaintiff's action that the
dog was generally inoffensive. Buck-
ley v. Leonard, 4 Den. 500.
Knowledge that a dog allowed to run
at large was of a savage and ferocious
disposition is not, however, of itself
sufficient to make the owner liable to one
bitten by the dog. To charge the owner
he must have had knowledge of the dog's
propensity to bite mankind: Keightlinger
v. Egan, supra.
If the mere reading of the principal
case were not sufficient to convince one
of its correctness, as it would seem it
must, the cases above cited must render
its correctness beyond question. On the
whole it is a very well considered case
and entirely satisfactory both on principle
and authority.
M. D. EWELL.
Chicago.
United States Circuit Court; -District of Oregon.
DUNDEE MORTGAGE AND TRUST INVESTMENT C0. v. HUGHES.
An attorney employed by a mortgagee to examine the security, and who gives
his client a certificate of title, is not liable to a subsequent assignee of the mortgage
for loss by reason of error in the certificafe.
A. applied to a money lender for a loan of $3000, and offered his note therefor,
secured by a mortgage on Pertain real property; B., the attorney of the money
lender, examined the title to the real property and furnished the latter a certificate
to the effect that A.'s title was good and the property unincumbered, and thereupon
the loan was made on the terms proposed ; subsequently, and before the maturity
of the note, it was assigned to the plaintiff, who foreclosed the mortgage and sold
the property, when it was found that it was incumbered by a prior mortgage, so
that the plaintiff did not realize the amount of his debt by $4794.35. Held, that
there was no privity of contract between B. and the plaintiff, and that he was
not liable to the latter for the loss.
DEmUitER to complaint.
William HT. -ffinger, for plaintiff.
The defendant in yropria persone.
The facts are stated in the opinion, which was delivered by
DEADlY, J.-This action is brought to recover, among other things,
damages to the amount of $5312.35, for losses alleged to have been
sustained on two loans on note and mortgage, amounting to $3300,
upon the certificate of the defendant, as an attorney at law, con-
cerning the title of the borrower to the mortgaged premises and the
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condition of his estate therein. From what I conceive to be the legal
effect of the statement of the first cause of action in the complaint
as amended, it appears that "about" April 28th 1877, the Oregon
and Washington Trust Investment Company was a 'corporation
formed under the laws of Great Britain, and resident in Dundee,
Scotland, and engaged in loaning money in Oregon upon note and
mortgage; that the defendant, who was then a practising attorney
in this state, was employed by said corporation to examine the title
and condition of the real property offered as security by any one
applying to said corporation for a loan; that at this time a loan of
$3000 was made by said corporation to C. W. Shaw, on his promis-
sory note, payable to its order on June 1st 1882i with interest, at
the rate of ten per centum per annum, and secured by a mortgage
on certain real property then owned by said Shaw, upon which
the defendant certified there was no prior lien or encumbrance;
that on December 19th 1879, said corporation "amalgamated" with
the plaintiff, and "assigned" thereto "all its mortgages," includ-
ing " all claim, right and interest to or in or growing out of this
loan to Shaw," and plaintiff is now "the owner and bolder thereof,"
of which the defendant had notice; that in 1882 the plaintiff
requested the defendant "to foreclose said mortgage," and in the
course of the proceeding therefor it was ascertained and determined
by the decree of this court that the same was subject to a prior
mortgage on the premises, so that the whole amount realized by
the plaintiff on said loan was $938.25; and that said Shaw is
insolvent. The second cause of action, as appears from the origi-
nal complaint, is upon a certificate given by the defendant to the
Oregon and Washington Savings Bank, another British corporation
engaged in loaning money in Oregon on note and mortgage, as to
the title of property taken by said corporation, as a security for a
loan of $300 made to H. H. Howard on November 27th 1876,
on his promissory note payable on December 1st 1877, with inter-
est at the rate of twelve per centum per annum, to the effect that
said Howard was the owner in fee of the same, and that it was
unencumbered; that in 1883 said corporation "found out" that
said property was not owned by said Howard, so that the whole
amount of said loan was lost; that Howard is insolvent, and the
plaintiff is now "the assignee' and "owner" of all the "assets" of
said corporation. The defendant demurs to both these statements,
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for that they do not contain facts sufficient to constitute a cause of
action.
In the first statement it is alleged that the loss arising from the
insufficiency of the security for the loan was sustained by the Oregon
and Washington Trust Investment Company, and that the defend-
ant now owes to said corporation the full amount thereof, to wit,
$4794.35 ; and it is also alleged that the plaintiff is now "the
owner and holder" of the mortgage, notwithstanding it appears
that the same has been "foreclosed" and merged in a decree of this
court and partly satisfied from the proceeds of the mortgaged prem-
ises; and notwithstanding the further allegation that the defendant
CC now owes" the amount of this loss to the Oregon and Washington
Trust Investment Company. But none of these contradictory alle-
gations are admitted by the demurrer, except such as the law
adjudges to be true (Freeman v. Prank, 10 Abb. Pr. 370), and
those which are mere conclusions of law are not thereby admitted
at all: Branham v. The Mayor, etc., 24 Cal. 602; 'Hall v. Bart-
lett, 9 Barb. 297. This action is brought upon the hypothesis that
the defendant is now liable to the plaintiff for this loss, but the
allegation that he "now owes" the amount thereof to the Oregon
and Washington Trust Investment Company is utterly at variance
therewith. He cannot be liable on this account to both of them at
the same time.
Again, it is alleged that the defendant "guaranteed" that the
Shaw property was clear of encumbrance. But this is a mere con-
clusion of law, and the facts stated do not support it. Upon these,
the transaction is simply an employment of the defendant by the
Oregon and Washington Trust Investment Company to examine
and report upon the title and condition of real property offered as
security for a loan by the latter. Prima facie there is no element
of a guaranty involved in such employment. The defendant only
undertook to bring to the discharge of his duty reasonable skill and
diligence. He did not warrant or guaranty the correctness of his
work any more than a physician or a mechanic does.
It is admitted that if the Oregon and Washington Trust Invest-
ment Company had sustained a loss by the negligence or want of
skill on the part of the defendant in this matter, the right to recover
damages for the same might be assigned to the plaintiff, and it could
maintain an action thereon. But taking the facts of the case accord-
ing to their legal import, and construing contradictory allegations
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according to the law of the case, the plaintiff does not sue as the
assignee of a cause of action accruing to the Oregon and Washing-
ton Trust Investment Company during its existence and ownership
of the Shaw note and mortgage. The only thing assigned by the
latter was this note and mortgage, and, nothing appearing to the
contrary, presumably the consideration therefor was equal to its
par value. It does not appear, then, that the assignor ever lost
anything by reason of the incorrectness of the defendant's certifi-
cate. Nor could the insufficiency of the surety be absolutely, if at
all, determined until the maturity of the note in 1882, while the
assignment to the plaintiff was made in 1879.
The only question, then, really in this case is whether the defend-
ant is liable, on this certificate, to any one but his employer, the
Oregon and Washington Trust Investment Company. The
defendant maintains that he is not, while the plaintiff contends he
is; not on the ground of privity of contract between them, or that
it was aware of the existence of the certificate, or ever acted on it,
or was misled by it, but on the ground that the certificate was a
necessary preliminary to the contract of loaning, and therefore an
integral part of that contract, operating, of course, as an assurance
or security to the person about to make the loan, but as much, a
part of the transaction as the mortgage itself. This question has
been decided by the Supreme Court in Savings Bank v. Ward, 100
U. S. 195. The case was this: A., an attorney employed by B.
to examine and report on the title of the latter to a certain lot of
ground, certified that it was "good," upon which certificate B. pro-
cured a loan from C., and gave a mortgage on the property as
security. It turned out that B. had parted with the title to
the property prior to the date of the certificate-a fact that,
in the exercise of reasonable care, might have been learned from
the records. The security having proved worthless, and B. being
insolvent, C. lost his money, and brought suit against A. for dam-
ages. The court held, in the language of the syllabus, "that there
being neither fraud, collusion, nor falsehood by A., nor privity of
contradt between him and C., he is not liable to the latter for any
loss sustained by reason of the certificate." True, Mr. Chief Justice
WAITE, with whom concurred Justices SwAYxE and BRADLEY.
delivered a dissenting opinion; not upon the general question,
however, but on the special ground that it appeared that A. gave
his client the certificate in question with knowledge, or reason to
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know, that he intended to use it in a business transaction with a
third person, as evidence of the facts contained therein, and was
therefore liable to such person for any loss resulting fiom a reliance
on such certificate, in any particular, which might have been pre-
vented by the exercise of ordinary care and skill on the part of A.
But this is not the case. The defendant prepared this certificate
at the instance and for the use of his client, the Oregon and Wash-
ington Trust Investment Company, and none other. Nor was
there anything in the nature of the business that informed him or
gave him any reason to believe that any other person would be
called upon to act upon it, or part with any right or thing of value
on the strength of the representations contained in it. Such a
certificate made at the instance of the owner of the property may
be used to influence a third person to make a loan thereon; but a
certificate made for the information of the lender is presumably
made for his use alone, and -when the loan is made and the security
accepted it is functus officio - has performed its office. The
defendant is liable to the Oregon and Washington Trust Investment
Company for any loss sustained by it on account of any error or
mistake in the certificate, arising from a want of ordinary profes-
sional skill and care in the preparation of it, and not otherwise.
But he is not so liable to the plaintiff, or any third person.
There is no privity of contract between them, or any relation
whatever.
The ruling is also maintained in Houseman v. Girard fM. B.
L. Association, 81 Penn. St. 256, in which it was held that the
recorder of deeds is liable in damages for a false certificate of title,
but only to the party who employs him to make the search, and not
to his assignee or alienee. And in Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M. &
W. (Exch.) 109, it was held that although the maker of a carriage
is liable to the person for whom he makes it, for any loss or injury
arising directly from negligence in its construction, he is not so
liable to any third *person who may use the same, for the reason
there is no privity of contract between them.
The statement of the second cause of action is of the same charac-
ter as the first; and it is also defective in not stating absolutely
that the certificate is untrue. The allegation that in 1883 the bank
"found out" that Howard did not own the property, is not in form
or effect an averment that he did not own the same and had not
title thereto at the date of the certificate. It does not appear to
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have been "found out" in any judicial proceeding that the certifi-
cate was untrue in this respect; and while it may, nevertheless, be
shown in this action' to be a fact, it must -first be alleged, so that
issue can be taken on it. Because in 1883 the bank was of the
opinion that Howard had no title to the land, that did not make it
so, and the statement of that irrelevant matter is not an allegation
by the plaintiff that he was not the owner thereof. Neither does
it appear that the bank ever made any assignment of this note and
mortgage to the plaintiff or of and claim that may have accrued to
it against the defendant for a loss sustained by it on account of any
error in this certificate. The allegation that the plaintiff is now the
"assignee" and" owner" of the "assets" of the bank is far too vague
and indefinite to include this note and mortgage, or such claim, if
there is one. The owner of what "assets ?" For aught thatappears,
the bank may have parted with this note and demand before the plain-
tiff became the owner of its assets. Unless it is shown when the
assignment was made and that the bank was then the owner of this
"asset," the plaintiff does not show itself entitled to maintain the
action, even upon its theory of the law and the defendant's liability.
The allegation that the plaintiff is "now" the assignee and owner
of the assets of the bank, implies, it is true, an assignment at some
time, but it cannot be assumed in favor of the plaintiff that it was
more than a day before the commencement of this action-January
9, 1884. But there is no direct allegation in the statement of any
loss on the mortgage or of the facts necessary to show one. The
statement that the loan was lost to the bank, appears to be a mere
inference from the fact that the bank was of the opinion that the
mortgagee had no title. And if there was such allegation, and it
appeared therefrom that the loss was sustained by the plaintiff,
the defendant is riot liable for it; while if it was sustained
by the bank the defendant is not liable to the plaintiff therefor,
unless it should further appear that the right of action thereon
has been duly assigned to it.
The demurrer is sustained to both'statements.
LIABILITY OF ATTORNEY TO CLIENT- ance of the undertaking, and if they are
ADVICE AS TO TITLES. negligent, or fail to exercise such rea-
Duty of Attorney.-Attorneys employed sonable care and skill in the discharge
by the purchasers of real property to in- of the stipulated service, they are respon-
vestigate the grantor's title, prior to the sible to their employers for the loss occa-
purchase, impliedly contract to exercise sioned by such neglect or want of care
reasonable care and skill in the perform- and skill: Addison on Contracts, 8th
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ed., 593; Savings Bank v. Ward, 100
U. S. 195.
Like care and skill are also required-
of attorneys when employed to investi-
gate titles to real estate to ascertain
whether it is a safe or sufficient security
for a loan of money, the rule being that
if the attorney is negligent or fails to
exercise reasonable care and skill in the
performance of the service, and a loss
results to his employers from such negli-
gence or want of care and skill, he shall be
responsible to them for the consequences
of such loss: Addison on Torts (Dudley
& Baylies's ed.) 499 ; Rowell v. Young,
5 B. & C. 259 ; Watson v. Muirhead, 57
Penn. St. 161.
So if a person engages in the business
of searching the public records, examin-
ing titles to real estate, and making
abstracts thereof, for compensation, the
law will imply that he assumes to possess
the requisite skill and knowledge, and
that he undertakes to use due and ordi-
nary care in the performance of the duty,
and for a failure iu either of these re-
spects, resulting in damages, the party
injured is entitled to recover: Clark v.
MAfarshall, 34 Alo. 429 ; Chase v. Heaney,
70 Ill. 270. See Story on Bailments,
see. 431.
If the attorney certifies that the se-
curity is a good one, he thereby war-
rants that the title shall not only be
found good at the end of a contested
litigation, but that it is free from any
palpable grave doubts or question as to
its validity: Page v. Trutch, 3 Cent.
Law J. 559; s. c. 8 Chicago Leg.
News 385.
The examiner of a title cannot limit
his liability by an obscure certificate,
without specially calling the attention of
the other party to it. If he discovers
that he cannot furnish a complete and
reliable abstract, it is his duty to give
the other party notice of the fact, that
lie may apply elsewhere; otherwise such
other party will have a right to rely on
his competency and fidelity: Chase v.
Hleaney, 70 LIt. 270. But by giving a
certificate of title he does not become an
indemuitor. He is liable for lack of due
care or diligence, and for ignorance of
his business : Rankii. v. Schqffer, 4 lo
App. lo.
The specific employment of an attor-
ney to examine a title does not in
itself' include the duty or obligation to
satisfy liens; it is dicharged by truly
ascertaining and reporting them : Joseph-
that r. Reyman, 2 Abb. N. C. 22.
Said the court, in Dodd v. Williams,
3 Me. App. 278: "What is a lien on
real estate may be a difficult question,
in some cases, to decide; but an exami-
ner of title is bound to know the state
of the law on the subject, at least suffi-
ciently to put him on his guard; and
where there maybe a reasonable doubt
as to whether such or such a recorded
instrument is a lien, if he choose to re-
solve the doubt he does so at his peril."
Whenever the attorney of a proposed
mortgagee has reason to suspect that the
intended mortgagor has been bankrupt
or insolvent, it is the duty of the attor-
ney to make proper searches to ascertain
the fact, and he is guilty of negligence
for not doing so: Cooper v. Stephenson,
21 L. J. (N. S.). Q.B. 292.
Where an attorney acts for a client
who advances money on a legacy given
under a will to the borrower, he is not
justified in relying upon a partial extract
from the will furnished, by his client,
unless the latter agrees to take the
responsibility on himself: Wilson v.
Tucker, 3 Stark 154. If the examiner
incorrectly states the quantity of land
previously conveyed, he will be liable:
Clarkv. Marshall, 34 M1o. 429.
Privity of Contract Necessary.-In
Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U. S. 195,
referred to in the principal case: A.,
an attorney employed and paid solely by
B. to examine and report on the title of
the latter to a certain lot of land, gave
over his signature this certificate: "B.'s
title to the lot" (describing it) " is good,
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and the property is unencumbered." C.,
with whom A. had no contract or com-
munication, relied upon this certificate
as true, and loaned money to B., upon
the latter executing, by way of security
therefor, a deed of trust for the lot. B.,
before employing A., had transferred the
lot in fee by a duly recorded convey-
ance, a fact which A., on examining the
records, could have ascertained, had he
exercised a reasonable degree of care.
The money loaned was not paid, and B.
being insolvent,- it was held, there be-
ing neither fraud, collusion, or falsehood
by A., no privity of contract between
him and C., lie was not liable to the
latter for any loss sustained by reason of
the certificate. See .-ish v. Kelly, 17
C. B. (N. S.) 194; Day v. Reynolds,
23 Hun 131; a. c. 11 N.Y. Weekly
Dig. 196 ; Commonwealth v. Harmer, 6
Phila. 90.
A., B. & C. were employed in a nian-
ufacturing business in which secrecy was
essential ; and to insure their fidelity,
they were required to execute deeds
under which a portion of their wages was
to be invested in the name of a trustee,
with a stipulation for determining the en-
gagement on giving two months' notice,
at the expiration of which, in the case of
B. and C., the money so invested was to
be paid over to them, but in the case of
A., the deed was s6 framed as to make
it payable only to his executors on his
death. D., the attorney for the em-
ployers, being upon the premises, was
asked by A. if he would receive his
money if he gave notice to quit the ser-
vice; whereupon D. (not recollecting
that A.'s deed differed in this respect
from those of B. and C., though he
himself drew them all and had them in
his custody) answered in the affirmative.
Upon receiving this information, A. gave
notice, but afterwards discovered that the
money invested for him could only be
paid to his executors. H-eld, that A.
could not maintain an action against D.
for the loss and disappointment sustained
by him in consequence of his acting upon
D.'s mistake: Rsh v. Kelly, supra.
It would seem that the rule as to
privity of contract should, in some in-
stances, be modified. In Savings Bank
v. Ward, supra, Air. Chief Justice
WAITS, with whom concurred Mr. Jus-
tice SwAYeE and Mr. Justice BRADLE,
in a dissenting opinion, said: "I think,
if a lawyer, employed to examine and
certify to the recorded title, of real pro-
perty, gives his client a certificate which
he knows or ought to know is to be used
by the client in some business transaction
with another person as evidence of the
facts certified to, he is liable to such
other person, relying on his certificate for
any loss resulting from his failure to find
on record a conveyance affecting the title,
which, by the use of ordinary profes-
sional care and skill, he might have
found."
Instances of Liability.-In Allen v.
Clark, 7 L. T. (N. S.) 781 ; 11 Weekly
R. 304, the plaintiff entered into a
contract for the purchase of certain
household property under certain condi-
tions of sale, one of which was that the
purchaser should take an under-lease,
"Caccording to the draft under-lease al-
ready prepared, which will be produced
at the time of sale, and may, in the
meantime, be inspected at the office of
H. ; but no abstract of the vendor's title
thereto shall be required, nor the lessor's
title objected to or gone into." He
afterwards employed the defendant's tes-
tator, an attorney, to complete the pur-
chase, who failed to make the required
search, or to investigate the vendor's title
or to require the production of the origi-
nal lease. It subsequently appeared that
the premises had been previously xnort-
gaged, and the plaintiff was turned out
of possession by the mortgagee. Beld,
that this amounted to negligence on the
part of the attorney sufficient to maintain
an action against him.
If an attorney is employed by the lender
to examine the title of real property
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offered as a security for a contemplated
loan by the borrower, he is responsible
to the lender for the correctness of his
opinion although the expense of the ex-
amination is paid by the borrower: Page
v. Trutch, 3 Cent. L. J. 559 ; 8 Chicago
L. N. 385.
If an attorney employed by a vendor
to settle on his part the assignment of a
term, allow him to execute an unusual
covenant without explaining the liability
thereby incurred, he is responsible to him
for his consequent loss, notwithstanding
he is himself, at the time of the assign-
ment, aware of the fact in respect to
which he afterwards incurs liability on
his covenant: Stannardv. Ullithorne, 10
Bing. 491; s. c. 3 Scott 771
In Taylor v. Blacklow, 3 Bing. 235,
the defendant, an attorney, being em-
ployed to raise money on mortgage for
the plaintiff, disclosed to the proposed
lender certain defects in plaintiff's title,
per quod, plaintiff was subjected to
divers actions at the suit of the proposed
lender, was delayed in obtaining the
money he wanted and compelled to give
higher rate of interest. Held, that this
was a breach of duty for which an action
would lie against the defendant, notwith-
standing he had been the attorney of the
proposed lender before his retainer by
the plaintiff.
An attorney is liable for a failure to
report a judgment by confession against
property: Gilman v. Hovey, 26 Mo. 280.
Where the declaration stated that the
plaintiff retained the defendants as at-
torneys in and about ascertaining the
title of G. R. to certain lands and tene-
ments, and to take due and proper care
that "the same" should be a sufficient
security for the repayment of a sum of
6001., Held, that the words "the same"
had reference to the title of G. R., and
were not to be construed as charging the
defendants upon a contract to inquire
into the value of the lands, and was,
therefore, supported by evidence of a
retainer to investigate the title as a se-
curity for the repayment of the 6001.:
Bayne v. Rhodes, 15 L. J. Q. 13. 137;
10 Jur. 71.
In Ware v. Lewis, Irish R., 4 Eq.
419, plaintiff gave a sum of money to a
firm of solicitors to invest upon freehold
security. They found a security and in-
vested the money upon it. The security
turned out valueless. Held, that the
giving of the money to the solicitors for
the purpose of general investment did
not of itself create the relation of trustee
and cestui que trust, so as to make them
liable as trustees.
In Craig v. Watson, 8 Beav. 427, a
solicitor took an insufficient security for
his client, and the nature of the transac-
tion was such as in the opinion of the
court created a case of combined agency
and trust. He was held (under the cir-
cumstances) personally responsible for
the deficiency and for the costs of the
suit.
And where A. placed moneys in the
bands of her solicitor, who acted also for
her as a money scrivener, undertaking
to find securities for her, and he placed
the moneys out on insufficient securities,
misrepresenting to her their character,
Held, that as against him, if living, it
would have been, and as against his es-
tate after his death it was not, a matter
for an action for negligence, but a matter
of account between principal and agent,
and the client had 1a right to reject the
charge for disbursements on the insuffi-
cient securities: Smith v. Pococke, 2
Drew. 197.
Where it is contended that the evi
dence fails to show that at the time the
abstract was made the judgment and
sale were of record, it was held that as
it was the duty of the officers to promptly
make the necessary records thereof, such
entry would be presumed to have been
made: Chase v. Eeaney, 70 Ill. 270.
As to what is sufficient evidence of
negligence, see Ireson v. Pear man, 3
Barn. & C. 799. See generally, Van
Schaick v. Sigel, 60 How. Pr. 122 ;
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affirming s. c. 58 How. Pr. 211; Dart-
nall v. Howard, 4 B. & C. 345; Knd~yhts
v. Quarles, 4 Moore 532; Matts v. Por-
ter, 3 El. & I. 743; Waine v. Kemp-
ster, 1 Fost. & r. 695 ; Potts v. Dutton,
8 Beav. 493; O'Hanlon v. Murray, Ir.
R., 12 C. L. 161.
A bill in equity will not lie against an
attorney for damages for negligence in
investigating a title : British Mutual In-
vestment Co. v. Cobbold, L. R., 19 Eq.
627 ; Nancrede v. Voorhis, 32 N. J.
Eq. 524. -But otherwise, if he becomes
a trustee to invest : Nancrede v. Voorhzs,
supra. In this case the attorney had
promised the complainant to obtain first
mortgage for her, and he was held-it
being a case of mingled trust and agency
-accountable for the amount of the en-
cumbrance on the property prior to hers,
but not for any subsequent depreciation
in the value, caused by general business
depression, the property at the time being
shown to have been, apart from the prior
encumbrances, abundant security.
To pass the title, there being at the
time a judgment by default against the
vendor, the damages on which have
not been liquidated, is not evidence of
a want of ordinary knowledge and skill
and due caution : Watson v. Mui,'ead,
57 Penn. St. 161. And deeds recorded
before the grantor has any record title
may be safely disregarded in examina-
tions of title under the system of regis-
tration and notice adopted in Missouri.
They are not constructive notice to an
innocent purchaser, and the examiner
is not bound to look for deeds of any
person through whom the title passes,
before the date of his record title : Dodd
v. trilliams, 3 Mo. App. 278. See also
State v. Bradish, 14 Mass. 296 ; Mc Gus-
ker v. McEvoy, 10 R. I. 610 ; Farmers'
Loan 4- Trust Co. v. Maltby, 8 Paige 361.
In Kimball v. Connolly, 33 How. Pr.
247, it was held that the county clerk of
the city and county of New York is not
liable for damages resulting from errors,
inaccuracies or mistakes in his certificates
of searches under the act of 1853, unless
the loss to the party by which such dam-
age accrued is the direct consequence of
such error or mistake. Thus, where the
owner of real estate, for the purpose of
procuring a loan of money thereon,
caused the usual written requisition to
the county clerk to search for judgments
against the property, to be delivered to
him, who made the requisite search, and
certified to its correctness in the usual
manner, and thereupon the loan of money
was obtained on bond and mortgage
upon the premises, and subsequently it
was ascertained that a certain judgment
upon the property had been overlooked
and not returned by the clerk, upon
which judgment the premises were there-
after sold, and the owner was compelled
to pay a considerable sum over and
above the amount of the judgment, in
order to compromise and settle the mat-
ter. Held, that the couity clerk was not
liable to the owner. His loss occurred
from the non-payment of the judgment,
and not from the error in the clerk's re-
turn. He obtained the loan for which
he applied, and nothing was abated from
it on account of this encumbrance.
An attorney having been retained by
two trustees about to advance trust money
upon the security of property already
mortgaged, to see that the secuiity was
sufficient and that the proper deeds were
executed, one of the trustees advanced
moneys on the execution of the mortgage
without receiving an assignment of the
first mortgage. It having turned out
that there was another previous mortgage,
and the security proved insufficient:
Held, that there was no evidence of neg-
ligence on the part of the attorney, al-
though by the agreement which he had
prepared, part of the money advanced
was to be applied to the redemption of
the prior mortgage ; it not appearing that
the defendant was aware of the trustee's
intention to act as he did: Brumbridqe
v. Massey, 28 L. J. (N. S.) Exch. 59;
32 L. T. 108.
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In Elder v. Bogardus, Lalor's Sup. The gist of the action is the negligence,
(N. Y.) 116, the declaration averred and therefore the statute of limitations
that the attorney was retained to exam-
ine the title to certain premises, and to
procure an estate in fee simple therein
to be conveyed to plaintiff within a rea-
sonable time, and assigned as a breach of
duty that the attorney did not procure a
good and sufficient title to the fee simple
within such reasonable time, but advised
plaintiff to purchase without having a
good unincumbered and sufficient title to
the fee simple, by reason whereof plain-
tiff had to pay a large sum to release
incumbrances. Held, bad on demurrer.
The action appeared to be brought for
not procuring an unincnmbered title,
while the retainer was to examine the
title and to procure a conveyance in fee
simple. The existence of incumbrances
did not prevent the plaintiff from acquir-
ing a title in fee. The retainer did not
cover the breach: Held, further, that the
.ieclaration should have stated what in-
cumbrances affected the premises. See
also, IVhitehead v. Greetham, 2 Bing.
464; 10 Moore 183.
Statute of Linitadtons.-The cause of
action accrues at the time the examiner
fails to do what he agreed to do, and not
at the time when it is discovered that the
certificate is untrue : Rankin v. Schaeffer,
4 Mo. App. 108 ; Short v. MAtcCarthy, 3
B. & Ald. 626 ; Wilcox v. Plummer, 4
Pet. 172 ; Argall v. Brgant, 1 Sandf.
98.
runs from the time of the negligence,
and not from the time of the loss of
interest: Howell v. Young, 2 Car. & P.
238; 5 B. & C. 259.
In an action upon the case, against a
recorder of deeds, for damages suffered
by reason of a false certificate of search
given by a recorder to the plaintiff, in
the absence of fraud the statute of lim-
itations begins to run from the time when
the search was given, and not from the
development of the damage, and it is
immaterial that the party who received
and paid for the search had no knowl-
edge of its falsity or cause for inquiry
until more than six years after it was
given. The cause of action, within the
meaning of the statute of limitations,
was the issuing of the false certificate.
The right of action accrued to the plaintiff
as soon as it parted with its money on
the faith of it, and from that period the
statute began to run: Owen v. Ivestern
Saving Fund, 97 Penn. St. 47.
See, generally, as to the liability of
attorneys for advice as to titles, Weeks
on Attorneys 520; Warvell on Ab-
stracts 555-565 ; Wharton on Neg. 751,
note; Shea. & Redf. on Neg. H 232,
233; Addison on Contracts 8th ed. 593;
Addison on Torts (Dudley & Baylies's
ed.) 499.
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